Establish an Insider Threat Program under NISPOM: What the ITPSO, FSO and NISP Contractors Need to Know (Security Clearances and Cleared Defense Contractors)

Your insider threat program needs to work, not just exist on paper.

You have an appointment memo, a training requirement, and a growing list of responsibilities. But can you explain what your program protects, how employees report concerns, and what your working group actually accomplishes?

Establish an Insider Threat Program Under NISPOM: What the ITPSO, FSO and NISP Contractors Need to Know by Jeffrey W. Bennett helps you turn scattered guidance into a practical, risk-based program for protecting classified information.

Written for Facility Security Officers (FSOs), Insider Threat Program Senior Officials (ITPSOs), and cleared defense contractors, this guide addresses the questions that keep programs stuck.

TURN COMMON PROGRAM PROBLEMS INTO PRACTICAL ACTION

I've been appointed. Where do I start?
Clarify roles, involve senior management, organize your working group, and document your program. Move from uncertainty to a plan you can put to work.

We're a small company. I can't take on another full-time job.
Discover ways to build on existing FSO and ITPSO tasks, reporting channels, and security processes instead of duplicating effort. Tailor your approach to the people and resources you have.

Our working group meets, but nothing changes.
Give your meetings purpose. Learn to identify information that needs protection, assess vulnerabilities, assign countermeasures, capture decisions, and follow through on actions.

We have safeguards, but are we addressing insider access?
Examine where classified information resides, who can access it, and how need to know is enforced. Look beyond locks, alarms, and clearance levels to identify gaps an insider could exploit.

How do we protect information without treating everyone as a suspect?
Explore an asset-focused approach that reduces vulnerabilities while respecting employee trust. Learn why cybersecurity monitoring and behavioral indicators are parts of a program, not its entire strategy.

Employees finish training, but do they know what to report?
Connect training to practical responsibilities. Use espionage case studies and reporting examples to help employees recognize potential concerns, understand reporting channels, and support an organized response.

We don't store classified information. What should our program do?
Find guidance for non-possessing facilities, including coordination with the organizations where your cleared employees perform classified work.

How will we demonstrate our program during a DCSA review?
Prepare to explain your processes and show supporting documentation. Connect working group records, risk assessments, training, reporting, and self-inspections to your program's activities.

PRACTICAL TOOLS TO HELP YOU GET STARTED

The appendices include appointment memorandums, an insider threat program charter and meeting agenda, a classified information inventory management and risk matrix, and training certificate templates. Adapt them to your organization instead of starting with a blank page.

MORE THAN A PLAN. A PROGRAM YOU CAN EXPLAIN AND IMPROVE.

Whether you are establishing your first program or strengthening an existing one, this book helps you focus on what matters: identifying what needs protection, reducing vulnerabilities, training employees, and documenting action.

Build your knowledge. Focus your working group. Approach your next security review with greater confidence.

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